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RESPONSE 
 
Historical Conditions or Transcendental Conditions: Response to Kevin 
Thompson’s Response 
Colin Koopman, University of Oregon 
 
In his response to my essay “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in 
Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages” Kevin Thompson ably mounts a number of 
important challenges to the exegetical and philosophical project I have proposed vis-
à-vis the writings of Michel Foucault.  I find Thompson’s response illuminating on a 
number of points.  The most important of these concerns the underlying philoso-
phical issues which myself and others (including Thompson, Béatrice Han-Pile, and 
Andrew Cutrofello) have taken as valuable materials for reflection in relation to 
Foucault’s important work.1  In what follows, my response is partly directed at the 
textual and philosophical themes at play between Thompson and myself, but is also 
partly directed at certain metaphilosophical questions of how we ought to direct 
ourselves to the relevant textual and philosophical matters of concern to us both.  
From this second metaphilosophical perspective, my aim here is not to definitively 
resolve the philosophical issues placed under scrutiny by Thompson and myself.  
Rather, my aim is to feature the depth and difficulty of some of these issues as they 
appear throughout the history of modern philosophy, from Kant (and certain of his 
predecessors) to Foucault (and certain of his successors).  I have chosen to take this 
approach insofar as I find Thompson’s response to my essay generously productive 
in that it effectively works to open up a set of timely philosophical issues so as to 
                                                 
1 Cf., Kevin Thompson, “Historicity and Transcendentality: Foucault, Cavaillès, and the Pheno-
menology of the Concept,” History and Theory, 47 (February 2008): 1-18.  Béatrice Han, Foucault’s 
Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical. Translated by Edward Pile (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998, 2002). Andrew Cutrofello, Discipline and Critique: Kant, Post-
structuralism, and the Problem of Resistance (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1994).  References through-
out contain, in some instances, two dates: in such cases the first date refers to the original year of 
publication in the original language and the second date refers to the year of publication of the 
translation and edition to which the page number citation refers. 
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help make them available to those of us invested in the modern philosophical project 
of critique. 
 
I. Textual Issues 
A key family of textual issues continues to separate my “Foucault-as-nontran-
scendental-Kantian” interpretation from that charted by those who proffer the 
“Foucault-as-phenomenologist” interpretation.  There are two moments at which 
these accounts diverge.  One moment of divergence concerns how we are to read 
Foucault’s writings in the late 1960s in which he appears explicitly disapproving of 
phenomenology, for instance in his famous reference to “transcendental narcissism” 
near the end of The Archaeology of Knowledge.2  A second divergence concerns how we 
interpret Foucault’s methodological-metaphilosophical reorientations of the early 
1970s involving an expansion (or, as Thompson nicely puts it, “intensification”) of 
his earlier archaeological approach into a more capacious methodological analytic 
that is most accurately, though perhaps clumsily, described as archaeology-plus-
genealogy. 
As to the first moment of divergence, Thompson in his response nicely di-
stinguishes between “constitutive phenomenology” (later Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty) and “realistic phenomenology” (earlier Husserl and Cavaillès).  Thompson’s 
view is that Foucault’s explicitly negative evaluations of phenomenology in the late 
1960s are meant only to point to one of these branches of phenomenology, the more 
widely-influential branch of phenomenology, namely constitutive phenomenology.  
Now, I believe that I could make much of the fact that Foucault in this period 
nowhere qualifies his criticisms of phenomenology in the way that Thompson 
suggests and that we can find the distinction Thompson is insisting upon only by 
importing later remarks of Foucault’s back into these earlier writings.  But I also 
accept that Thompson could by turns make much of the fact that these later remarks 
are crucial for understanding Foucault’s intellectual influences such that his 
interpretation of Foucault relies on honest intellectual importation rather than an 
anachronistic smuggling of ideas.  One of the wonderful things about philosophers 
as creative as Foucault is that their writings are amenable to multiple interpretations.  
I doubt that either Thompson or myself could ever definitively show that our 
interpretation is the only one that the relevant texts withstand.  But what we can do, 
and have both sought to do, is to develop an interpretation that is compelling and 
consistent. 
This brings me to the importance of the second moment of divergence I have 
flagged.  It is in connection with Foucault’s later methodological reorientation that 
                                                 
2 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: 
Pantheon, 1969, 1972), 203. 
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his earlier criticisms of phenomenology ought to be understood.  The core of the 
view I sought to elaborate in my essay is that Foucault departs from the 
transcendental project central to phenomenology and other philosophical traditions 
working in the wake of Kantianism.  If Foucault is indebted to phenomenologists 
such as Cavaillès, then my view is that his debt here does not extend to any of the 
transcendental aspects of the phenomenological project, be it grounded in 
transcendental subjectivity (as with constitutive phenomenology) or in subjectless 
historical-transcendental conditions (as with realistic phenomenology).  When Fou-
cault sniffed out remnant whiffs of transcendentality in his archaeological metho-
dology, he felt compelled to first quip about the “transcendental narcissism” in his 
phenomenological inheritance, and then to revise his methodology such that an 
analytic of archaeology-plus-genealogy could be employed in a way that would 
avoid the project of transcendental analysis essential to every version of pheno-
menology.  Foucault was a historical thinker, not a transcendental thinker.3  One of 
Foucault’s most important and lasting contributions to the French philosophy of his 
period consisted in his ability to break free of the various invocations of 
transcendentality (including Husserl-isms, Hegel-isms, Marx-isms, and Freud-isms) 
that dominated the philosophical milieu of post-war France.  Foucault, like Deleuze, 
created new ways of doing philosophy. 
Even if we take into account both of these moments of divergence, I am still 
not entirely convinced that the sort of exegetical disagreement I have been 
discussing can be resolved to the satisfaction of all involved.  However, I am also not 
at all convinced that overcoming such disagreements should be our aim.  Philoso-
phical texts, like all valuable texts, do not and cannot carry the rules for their own 
interpretation.  This point, to my mind as Foucaultian as it is Wittgensteinean, helps 
explain why philosophical works are importantly amenable to historical transfor-
mation.  Taking this point seriously also helps us see that our primary aim as philo-
sophical interpreters should not be to nail down the views of our predecessors, but 
should instead be to feature the richness of the history of thought in a way that 
allows us to productively appropriate philosophical concepts, ideas, and strategies 
for our own purposes in the present.  My sense is that Thompson agrees with me 
about this—and this perhaps explains why I have found his version of the Foucault-
as-phenomenologist interpretation a productive view to engage in the context of my 
                                                 
3 I quote again Georges Canguilhem, one of those philosophers who influenced Foucault and 
whom Thompson would place in the vein of realistic phenomenology: “Foucault disparaged 
questions with transcendental implications, preferring those with historical implications.” 
“Introduction,” in T.J. Armstrong (ed.), Michel Foucault: Philosopher (Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1989, 1992), xvi. That quotation, in so many words, is my very simple point. 
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putting forward an alternative interpretation.  But at this point I am already spea-
king from the point of view of the philosopher, rather than the scholar, who lives 
within me.  So allow me to now turn to the philosophical issues for which Foucault’s 
thought provides a rich field upon which to work out these ideas. 
 
II. Philosophical Issues 
When Foucault undertook the methodological shift that led him from archaeology to 
archaeology-plus-genealogy, he must have done so in part because he began to 
realize that archaeology could not explain something which Foucault was eager to 
explain, namely how conditions can condition our practices in such a way as to both 
constrain these practices and be consistent with their historical transformability.  
Phenomenology ably showed how our practices are conditioned.  Yet it failed to 
show how conditioned practices are amenable to transformation.  This is because it 
theorized conditions as Kant had done, namely as transcendental.  But since tran-
scendental conditions are universal in scope and necessary in modality (even if only 
with respect to a given historical a priori, as historical-transcendental phenomeno-
logists would have it) they purchase their explanatory power only by divesting 
themselves of the idea of historical transformability.4 
Foucault aimed to show how our practices are simultaneously conditioned 
and historical.  This is a very fine line to toe—from the perspective of the history of 
philosophy it involves nothing less than appropriating crucial strategies from both 
Kant and Hegel without making use of any of the transcendental trappings implicit 
in their analytic and dialectic methods.  Foucault’s earlier archaeologies can be seen 
as a first stalled attempt at such a project—the archaeological writings richly 
featured conditioning (as phenomenological inquiries had) but in the end they 
remained rather barren with respect to processes of historical transformation (which 
are of course only implicit in an archaeological view and indeed not even theorizable 
in that view).  Foucault’s later genealogies took him much further toward his 
philosophical desideratum of a methodology that could engage conditional con-
straint and historical contingency at once. 
This brings me to the central concept for the interpretation of Foucaultian 
genealogy I am putting forward.  This is the concept of problematization.  My inter-
pretation of the role of “problematization” in Foucault’s work differs from Thomp-
                                                 
4 For example, a good will for Kant always is and must involve acting out of duty to the moral 
law, and so the idea of a good will is not the kind of thing that can have a history.  That explains a 
lot, but it decidedly fails (indeed in Kant it positively refuses!) to explain the historical locations 
and shapes in which the idea of the good will emerges, stabilizes, and may perhaps come to 
disappear.  At this point, of course, I am aping (a certain interpretation of) Hegel’s criticisms of 
Kant.  And this, of course, makes good sense in the context of a philosophical consideration of the 
relation between transcendentality and historicity. 
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son’s in a few ways.  Some of these ways are incidental to the present discussion.5  
Others bear directly on interpretive issues concerning how we should read 
Foucault’s relationship to Kant, Husserl, Cavaillès, and others.  Allow me to discuss 
what I take to be the most decisive point concerning problematization. 
What is the conditioning role played by problematizations if these are 
understood as conditions of possibility for historically contingent practices?  Thomp-
son helpfully captures the central philosophical issue that divides our respective 
interpretive and philosophical views when he asks “whether or not these conditions 
ought to be viewed, as Koopman proposes, as contingently forged antecedent states 
of affairs or processes or as historical eidetic structures as I have claimed.”  Thomp-
son then goes on to explain that he finds my view misguided because it would force 
us “into an impasse where the question of the causal efficacy of such conditions, 
here in the form of historical causation, would, of necessity, be opened but would be 
impossible to resolve.” 
But I am not sure that causation is the right register on which to locate the 
issue.  I do not see Foucault as directing our attention toward merely causal 
conditioning.  I see Foucault as directing our attention to empirical conditions not as 
causes that make real but as constraints that make possible.  Conditions enable or 
disable, but they do not bring anything into being in a way that a billiard ball forces 
another off in the direction of the pocket.  Conditions of possibility are more like the 
entire ensemble of ball, cue, stick, felt-topped table, and spirits of friendship and 
competition in which a certain practice is made possible.  On my reading the entire 
ensemble itself is indeed the product of “antecedent states of affairs” but only so 
long as we understand “states of affairs” capaciously to involve all things at play in 
a practice rather than narrowly as referring to structures of causality describable in 
the language of a perfect physics.  These complex states of affairs, call them condi-
tioning ensembles or more simply problematizations, enable and disable present prac-
tices and are themselves conditioned in turn by historical practices.  This marks the 
difference, as Thompson states, between a conditioning that is historical all the way 
down and a conditioning that refers in the last instance to a historical-transcendental 
structure.  Just as a billiard ball cannot roll off toward the pocket if not pushed by 
another (or perhaps by a cheating hand), so a gang of gamers cannot get together to 
                                                 
5 One incidental point deserves parenthetical mention.  Thompson describes “problematizations” 
as objects of inquiry for Foucault.  This they are, but not just this.  I take “problematization” in 
Foucault to refer to both an object of inquiry, namely a historical set of conditions of possibility for 
practices, and a modality of an act of inquiry, namely a philosophical investigation and 
intensification of problematizations taken as objects.  Problematization, accordingly, functions as 
both a noun and a verb.  A problematization is something we inquire into and it is also a 
methodology for inquiry. 
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shoot pool if a vast many things had not happened in the past whereby that practice 
emerged into being as something that it is possible for you and me to do.  Those vast 
many things do not cause you and me to play pool, but they do enable our cuesports 
and many other things besides. 
With this distinction between critical-empirical and causal-empirical condi-
tions in place allow me to now restate the impasse that Thompson has located in a 
slightly different vocabulary.  The impasse that Thompson locates in my view refers, 
as I see it, to the difficult question of how our practices can be at one and the same 
time constrained by conditions of possibility and also contingent in being amenable to 
historical transformation.  Do not constraint and contingency pull in opposite direc-
tions?  Do not conditions work to stop the flowing time of change whereas history is 
precisely the dynamic flight of change itself?  Thompson is right that there is indeed 
an enormous tension here.  But I cannot bring myself to regard it as a philosophical 
contradiction or a theoretical impasse. 
Indeed, one of the deepest tensions at the heart of contemporary living which 
Foucault so patiently sought to elaborate in nearly all of his work concerns the 
possibility of our being simultaneously constrained and free.  This is a key 
problematization, both philosophically and practically, for those of us living in the 
twentieth- and twenty-first centuries.  Foucault’s Discipline and Punish and other 
books, including Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, offer some of its most compelling 
expressions.6  It is at the heart of what motivates many of us to attempt to elaborate 
the practices we are engaged in as a response to the dangers of the debilitating 
dissection between power and freedom that is our historical condition.7  Many of his 
most severe critics have worried that Foucault cannot definitively resolve the 
pressing philosophical issue of how conditions of possibility can be constraining at 
the same time that they lend themselves to the contingencies of historical change.  
But I find this a misplaced worry, at least with respect to Foucault.  The most 
important point of a book like Discipline and Punish is to feature certain problems of 
ours in a way that practically forces us to stop pretending that we can let ourselves 
off the hooks we are hanging on by forging supposed solutions to the problema-
tizations that are so central to who we are.  Foucault made this aspect of his work 
quite explicit in many of his interviews, including one conducted in 1978: “The 
problems I try to pose—those tangled things that crime, madness, and sex are, and 
                                                 
6 Cf., Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish. Translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1975, 1995), Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New 
York: Routledge, 1990), and in a somewhat different vein (and one that I find enormously 
instructive) Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 
1999). 
7 I address this contemporary problematization in greater detail in Colin Koopman, “Revising 
Foucault: The History and Critique of Modernity” Philosophy & Social Criticism, 36, 5 (May 2010).  
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that concern every life—cannot easily be resolved.”8  Foucault here states a central 
intent of his work as I read it: to draw our attention to the way in which we fashion 
ourselves as subjects in terms of the tensions set up by our many-faceted divisions 
between freedom and power, contingency and constraint, history and condition.  We are 
on both sides of these divisions and as such are problematically divided against 
ourselves.  There is no easy resolution of this “impasse” at the heart of our historical 
present.  Hence the importance of patience with respect to that which we are most 
impatient about: the transformation of the way in which we give freedom to our 
selves.9 
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8 Michel Foucault, “Interview with Michel Foucault” (conducted by Duccio Trombadori), in 
Michel Foucault, Essential Works of Foucault, Volume 3: Power. Edited by Paul Rabinow and James 
Faubion (New York: New Press, 1980, 2000), 288. 
9 Cf. Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Michel Foucault, Essential Writings of Michel 
Foucault, Volume One: Ethics. Edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1984, 1997), 319.  
